Examples from Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work

Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work

During the recruitment of new staff, an employer checks the profiles of the candidates on various social networks and includes information from these networks (and any other information available on the internet) in the screening process.
Only if it is necessary for the job to review information about a candidate on social media, for example in order to be able to assess specific risks regarding candidates for a specific function, and the candidates are correctly informed (for example, in the text of the job advert) the employer may have a legal basis under Article 7(f) to review publicly-available information about candidates.

An employer monitors the LinkedIn profiles of former employees that are involved during the duration of non-compete clauses. The purpose of this monitoring is to monitor compliance with such clauses. The monitoring is limited to these former employees.
As long as the employer can prove that such monitoring is necessary to protect his legitimate interests, that there are no other, less invasive means available, and that the former employees have been adequately informed about the extent of the regular observation of their public communications, the employer may be able to rely on the legal basis of Article 7(f) of the DPD.

An employer intends to deploy a TLS inspection appliance to decrypt and inspect secure traffic, with the purpose of detecting anything malicious. The appliance is also able to record and analyse the entirety of an employee’s online activity on the organisation’s network.
Use of encrypted communications protocols is increasingly being implemented to protect online data flows involving personal data against interception. However, this can also present issues, as the encryption makes it impossible to monitor incoming and outgoing data. TLS inspection equipment decrypts the data stream, analyses the content for security purposes and then re-encrypts the stream afterwards.
In this example, the employer relies upon legitimate interests—the necessity to protect the network, and the personal data of employees and customers held within that network, against unauthorised access or data leakage. However, monitoring every online activity of the employees is a disproportionate response and an interference with the right to secrecy of communications. The employer should first investigate other, less invasive, means to protect the confidentiality of customer data and the security of the network.
To the extent that some interception of TLS traffic can be qualified as strictly necessary, the appliance should be configured in a way to prevent permanent logging of employee activity, for example by blocking suspicious incoming or outgoing traffic and redirecting the user to an information portal where he or she may ask for review of such an automated decision. If some general logging would nonetheless be deemed strictly necessary, the appliance may also be configured not to store log data unless the appliance signals the occurrence of an incident, with a minimization of the information collected.
As a good practice, the employer could offer alternative unmonitored access for employees. This could be done by offering free WiFi, or stand-alone devices or terminals (with appropriate safeguards to ensure confidentiality of the communications) where employees can exercise their legitimate right to use work facilities for some private usage17. Moreover, employers should consider certain types of traffic whose interception endangers the proper balance between their legitimate interests and employee’s privacy—such as the use of private webmail, visits to online banking and health websites—with the aim to appropriately configure the appliance so as not to proceed with interception of communications in circumstances that are not compliant with proportionality. Information on the type of communications that the appliance is monitoring should be specified to the employees.
A policy concerning the purposes for when, and by whom, suspicious log data can be accessed should be developed and made easily and permanently accessible for all employees, in order to also guide them about acceptable and unacceptable use of the network and facilities. This allows employees to adapt their behaviour to prevent being monitored when they legitimately use IT work facilities for private use. As good practice, such a policy should be evaluated, at least annually, to assess whether the chosen monitoring solution delivers the intended results, and whether there are other, less invasive tools or means available to achieve the same purposes.

An employer deploys a Data Loss Prevention tool to monitor the outgoing e-mails automatically, for the purpose of preventing unauthorised transmission of proprietary data (e.g. customer’s personal data), independently from whether such an action is unintentional or not. Once an e-mail is being considered as the potential source of a data breach, further investigation is performed.
Again, the employer relies upon the necessity for his legitimate interest to protect the personal data of customers as well as his assets against unauthorised access or data leakage. However, such a DLP tool may involve unnecessary processing of personal data —for example, a “false positive” alert might result in unauthorized access of legitimate e-mails that have been sent by employees (which may be, for instance, personal e-mails).
Therefore, the necessity of the DLP tool and its deployment should be fully justified so as to strike the proper balance between his legitimate interests and the fundamental right to the protection of employees’ personal data. In order for the legitimate interests of the employer to be relied upon, certain measures should be taken to mitigate the risks. For example, the rules that the system follows to characterize an e-mail as potential data breach should be fully transparent to the users, and in cases that the tool recognises an e-mail that is to be sent as a possible data breach, a warning message should inform the sender of the e-mail prior to the e-mail transmission, so as to give the sender the option to cancel this transmission.

An organisation offers fitness monitoring devices to its employees as a general gift. The devices count the number of steps employees take, and register their heartbeats and sleeping patterns over time.
The resulting health data should only be accessible to the employee and not the employer. Any data transferred between the employee (as data subject) and the device/service provider (as data controller) is a matter for those parties.
As the health data could also be processed by the commercial party that has manufactured the devices or offers a service to employers, when choosing the device or service the employer should evaluate the privacy policy of the manufacturer and/or service provider, to ensure that it does not result in unlawful processing of health data on employees.

An employer maintains a server room in which business-sensitive data, personal data relating to employees and personal data relating to customers is stored in digital form. In order to comply with legal obligations to secure the data against unauthorised access, the employer has installed an access control system that records the entrance and exit of employees who have appropriate permission to enter the room. Should any item of equipment go missing, or if any data is subject to unauthorised access, loss or theft, the records maintained by the employer allow them to determine who had access to the room at that time.
Given that the processing is necessary and does not outweigh the right to private life of the employees, it can be in the legitimate interest under Art. 7(f), if the employees have been adequately informed about the processing operation. However, the continuous monitoring of the frequency and exact entrance and exit times of the employees cannot be justified if these data are also used for another purpose, such as employee performance evaluation.

A transport company equips all of its vehicles with a video camera inside the cabin which records sound and video. The purpose of processing these data is to improve the driving skills of the employees. The cameras are configured to retain recordings whenever incidents such as sudden braking or abrupt directional change take place. The company assumes it has a legal ground for the processing in its legitimate interest under Article 7(f) of the Directive, to protect the safety of its employees and other drivers’ safety.
However, the legitimate interest of the company to monitor the drivers does not prevail over the rights of those drivers to the protection of their personal data. The continuous monitoring of employees with such cameras constitutes a serious interference with their right of privacy. There are other methods (e.g., the installation of equipment that prevents the use of mobile phones) as well as other safety systems like an advanced emergency braking system or a lane departure warning system that can be used for the prevention of vehicle accidents which may be more appropriate. Furthermore, such a video has a high probability of resulting in the processing of personal data of third parties (such as pedestrians) and, for such a processing, the legitimate interest of the company is not sufficient to justify the processing.

A delivery company sends its customers an e-mail with a link to the name and the location of the deliverer (employee). The company also intended to provide a passport photo of the deliverer. The company assumed it would have a legal ground for the processing in its legitimate interest (Article 7(f) of the Directive), allowing the customer to check if the deliverer is indeed the right person.
However, it is not necessary to provide the name and the photo of the deliverer to the customers. Since there is no other legitimate ground for this processing, the delivery company is not allowed to provide these personal data to customers.